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E-mail address: jegalan@est-econ.uc3m.es (J.E. Galán)a b s t r a c tThe electricity reform in Colombia has exhibited gains in terms of reliability but its effects on ﬁrm efﬁciency and
service quality have not been clear. Previous studies evaluating the performance of distribution companies after
the reform have not found evidence of improvements, although large differences in efﬁciency have been found
among ﬁrms. This suggests high inefﬁciency persistence and heterogeneity in the Colombian distribution sector.
In this paper, we propose an extension of dynamic stochastic frontier models that accounts for unobserved het
erogeneity in the inefﬁciency persistence and in the technology. The model incorporates total expenses, service
quality and energy losses in an efﬁciency analysis of Colombian distributors over ﬁfteen years after the reform.
We identify the presence of high inefﬁciency persistence in the sector, and important differences between
ﬁrms. In particular, rural companies and ﬁrms with small customers present low persistence and evidence the
largest gains in efﬁciency during the period. However, increases in efﬁciency are only manifested during
the last ﬁve years when the main improvements in service quality and energy losses are presented. Overall,
inefﬁciency persistence, customer density and consumption density are found to be important criteria to be
considered for regulatory purposes.1. Introduction
The electricity market reform introduced in Colombia in 1994
established a new structure of the sector and new conditions for private
participation and competition. The reform was mainly motivated by an
energy crisis suffered in 1992 1993 that caused major blackouts as a
consequence of extreme droughts. This situation revealed the inefﬁ
ciency and inability of the state owned industry to satisfy an increasing
demand and to deal with weather events. The regulatory reform
adapted a version of the UK model with the creation of a pool where
prices are settled in a bidding process. The Electric Law of 1994 created
the regulatory commission Comisión Reguladora de Energía y Gas
(CREG) and split the traditional vertically integrated and monopolistic
system into the activities of generation, transmission, distribution and
retailing.esearch Group at the University
try of Education and Science,
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.As a consequence, the seven major public holdings in charge of
multiple activities from generation to distribution previous to the
reform were divested into eleven companies performing only one of
these activities and two companies involved in both generation and
distribution. Although generation and distribution were allowed to be
performed by the same company, limits to the amount of electricity
that the distributor could buy from its own generation ﬁrm were set
and separate managerial and accounting procedures were required.
However, privatization and competitionhave been slowprocesses in
Colombia. After the reform only two of the new companies were fully
privatized and, although in the following years several companies
were open to private capital, in most of the cases private investors are
minority shareholders andﬁrms remain under the control ofmunicipal
ities and regional governments. Certainly, privatization and competition
have been identiﬁed as pending issues in Colombia in previous studies
analyzing the effects of the ﬁrst years of the reform (see Pombo &
Taborda, 2006; Larsen et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, these processes have accelerated in recent years.
From 2010 to 2012, the number of generating and retailing ﬁrms has
increased by 23% and 32%, respectively, and most of the companies
involved in these activities are classiﬁed as private owned. In distribu
tion, companies with a majority of public capital account for 62% of
the total ﬁrms and serve 51% of the total users. Currently there are 541
generation, 33 distribution and 85 retailing companies. Of the
generation ﬁrms, 12 are also involved in distribution and 15 combine
generation exclusively with retailing activities.1
In general, the effects of the reform have been positive in terms
of the ability of the electricity sector to overcome extremeweather con
ditions and to satisfy the increasing demand. Since the reform, Colombia
has not experienced blackouts in spiteof some severe droughts that
have affected the region during the 1997 1998 and 2009 2010 periods,
and that have seriously affected neighbor countries. Moreover,
Colombiahas become an electricity exporter to Ecuador and Venezuela
and it is currently planning to export electricity to other Central
American and Caribbean countries.2
On the other hand, the effects of the reform in terms of energy losses
and service quality have not been successful until recent years. During
the ﬁrst ten years of the reform, energy losses and electricity interrup
tions did not present reductions and were even higher than previous
to the reform. Colombia also exhibited a very bad performance in
these aspects when compared to other countries in the region (see
Larsen et al., 2004; Dyner et al., 2006). Only from 2008, important
reductions in energy losses can be observed. In terms of the length of
interruptions, although it is possible to identify some improvements
since 2005, it is only until 2011 that signiﬁcant reductions are evident.
In both cases, these improvements are consequence of changesin the
regulation, as is discussed further below.
Meeting the quality requirements and satisfying the increases in
electricity consumption and users has required distribution companies
to make important investments. In fact, capital and operational
expenses have increased by more than 30% during the period 1998
2012. This suggests the need to study the effects of the reform and the
latest regulations established by CREG on efﬁciency. Concerning this
issue, some few previous studies have quoted the effects on efﬁciency
of the reform in Colombia and no major gains have been identiﬁed.
Pombo & Taborda (2006) use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to per
form an analysis of technical efﬁciency of Colombian distribution ﬁrms
during theperiod from1985 to 2001. The authorsﬁndnomajor changes
during the period and highlight that themost efﬁcient ﬁrms previous to
the reform continue to be in the best practice frontier but ﬁrms which
were inefﬁcient have not been able to change this condition and present
even lower efﬁciency scores. A similar result was found by Melo &
Espinosa (2005), who measure the technical efﬁciency of Colombian
distributors from 1999 to 2003 using Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA). The authors found out that public companies perform better
than those privately owned but that there have not beenmajor changes
in technical efﬁciency in the immediate years after the reform. This
Colombian evidence contrasts with the effects of the electricity reforms
on performance in other South American countries. In Chile and
Argentina evidence has been found on important improvements in
efﬁciency and service quality after the reforms (see Pollitt, 2004,
2008), for complete studies of the effects of the reforms in these coun
tries, respectively. The case of Chile is interesting since its reform in
1982 was not only the ﬁrst in the region but also the ﬁrst in the world
along with the U.K. In fact, as stated in Pollitt(2004) it has been recog
nized as a successful example and has been used as a model for other
privatizations in Latin America and around the world. In Brazil, the
reform introduced in 1995 has been found to improve technical efﬁ
ciency during the post reform years by Mota (2003). Pérez Reyes &
Tovar (2009) also found increases in productivity and efﬁciency of
distribution companies after the reform introduced in 1993.
Findings from these studiesmay suggest the presence of high adjust
ment costs in the Colombian distribution sector that imply inefﬁciency
to be highly persistent in time. In this context, it is costly for ﬁrms to1 Information provided by the national supervisory agency of public services
Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (SSPD) in 2013.
2 In 2011, Colombia exported 1.740 GWh. Information from the Ministry of Mines and
Energy.move towards optimal conditions and they may ﬁnd it optimal to
remain inefﬁcient in the short run. These studies have also evidenced
the existence of important differences among ﬁrms with different
characteristics in terms of their performance.
Therefore, this work has two main aims: ﬁrst, to identify the
presence of adjustment costs in the distribution sector after the reform
and distinguish heterogeneity in the technology and the inefﬁciency
among Colombian distributors; second, to estimate measures of
efﬁciency that consider costs and quality of service in the Colombian
electricity sector and their evolution from the ﬁrst years after the reform
into the following ﬁfteen years. In particular, we focus on the last ﬁve
years, when most of the changes in terms of quality, demand and
costs have occurred.
For these purposes we propose a dynamic heterogeneous SFA
model, which extends other dynamic speciﬁcations in the frontier
efﬁciency literature. In particular, we extend the dynamic model
introduced by Tsionas (2006) in order to allow for heterogeneous
persistence and unobserved technological heterogeneity. This allows
us to identify differences in the adjustment costs faced by ﬁrms and to
distinguish inefﬁciency properly from unobserved ﬁrm characteristics.
Inference of the model is performed using the Bayesian approach and
the effects of the proposed speciﬁcation on efﬁciency estimations are
evaluated.
The paper is divided into six sections including this introduction.
In the second section, we describe the main characteristics of the
Colombian electricity distribution sector after the reform. In the third
section, we review previous literature on dynamic SFA models and het
erogeneity in the electricity sector, andwe present the proposedmodel,
the estimation procedure and themodel speciﬁcation. In the fourth sec
tion, we describe the data and the empirical model. In the ﬁfth section,
we analyze the estimation results. Finally, we present some conclusions.2. Colombian electricity distribution sector
The activity of electricity distribution in Colombia is deﬁned by CREG
as the transportation of electricity from the national transmission
system, which operates at voltages above 220 kV, to the ﬁnal user.
There are four different levels of tension operated by the distributor.
That is, from level 1, which involves tension levels below 1 kV, to level
4 with tension levels between 57.5 kV and 115 kV. CREG follows a
cost of service type of regulation and establishes the pricing formula
for distributors for each of the tension levels considering demand,
investments, and administration, operation and maintenance costs.
The length of the price review is ﬁve years and the ﬁrst pricing period
was 1998 2002.3
Besides prices, service quality and energy losses have also been
under regulation. In 1998 CREG established maximum values for both
duration and number of interruptions by tension level, as well as com
pensations to users when companies exceeded these maximums.4
However, small and slow improvements motivated CREG to modify
this scheme in 2008. The new regulation introduced quality incentives
in the pricing formula and compensations for the most affected users.5
Under this model, an index of service discontinuity is calculated quar
terly and three ranges of values for this index are set: if distribution
companies exceed an acceptable range their pricing formula is revised
down; if they perform better than the acceptable values their formula
is revised up; and if their discontinuity index is within the acceptable
range their formula does not change. The implementation of this mech
anism has been postponed and only from 2011 have all companies
had to report this index. The effects of this last regulatory scheme are
still uncertain. In the literature, some studies have found this direct3 CREG resolution 031 of 1997.
4 CREG resolution 070 of 1998.
5 CREG resolution 097 of 2008.
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Fig. 1. Average customer hours lost (CHL) and energy losses (EL) per ﬁrm.mechanism of incentive regulation to have negative effects on quality
of service (see Ter Martirosyan & Kwoka, 2010). However, the most
important reductions in the length of interruptions have occurred
since then. This can be observed in Fig. 1, where the evolution in
customer hours lost (CHL) and energy losses (EL) from 1998 to 2012
is presented for the sample of distribution companies described in
Section 4.6
Regarding energy losses, new regulations were also set by CREG in
2008 by establishing a program for reducing losses and setting upper
limits for the percentage of losses recognized by users via tariff.7 The
effects of this regulation also seem to be positive (see Fig. 1).
During the period 1998 2012, the electricity consumption and the
number of connected users have also presented important increases
(27% and 51%, respectively). Fig. 2 presents this evolution for the same
ﬁrms above. We can observe that, after a period characterized by
economic recession and low growth rates (1999 2003), consumption
and customers exhibit an upward trend with high growth in the most
recent years.
Satisfying the demand and meeting the quality requirements have
had effects on the costs of distribution ﬁrms. Fig. 3 presents the evolu
tion of capital and operational expenses in real US dollars of 2012 for
the same companies in the ﬁgures above. We observe important
increases, mainly in operational expenses, from 2007, when relatively
higher capital expenses were made. The overall increase in real total
expenses from 1998 to 2012 was 31%.
Higher distribution costs have had an impact on the tariff for
the ﬁnal user. Fig. 4 plots the evolution of the tariff per kWh by
decomposing it into each of their components. Although almost all the
components of the tariff have increased in real terms, the proportion
of the distribution component has raised from 33% to 40% during the
period, with a particular increase in 2011 and 2012.
Regarding tariffs, it is important to remark that CREG establishes
their value only for regulated users. After the reform, customers
were separated into regulated and non regulated users,which are differ
entiated in terms of their power demand and consumption. Since 2000,
CREG has deﬁned regulated users as those with power demands under
0.1 MW and monthly consumption below 55 MWh.8Non regulated
users are allowed to negotiate retail prices with retailing companies.
3. Methodology
Frontier efﬁciency models have become a very useful tool to study
the impact of the deregulation processes carried out in many countries6 CHL is the duration of service interruptionsmeasured in hours per customer and EL is
the percentage of energy lost due to technical reasons.
7 CREG resolutions 199 and 121 of 2007.
8 CREG Resolution 131 of 1998.from the 1990s and to analyze the performance of the participants in
the different stages from generation to retailing. In particular, SFA, ﬁrst
introduced in Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen & van den Broeck
(1977) has the advantage of allowing inferences on the parameters
and considering idiosyncratic errors, in contrast to the most common
non parametric methods such as DEA. It also allows dealing easier
with panel data structures and to model the evolution of efﬁciency
over time. Two different approaches have been used in the literature
for this purpose. The most common approach estimates the temporal
pattern of the variation in inefﬁciency by using deterministic speciﬁca
tions of time. Herewe ﬁnd the proposals by Kumbhakar (1990), Battese
& Coelli (1992), Lee and Schmidt (1993), and Cornwell et al. (1990).
These models have the problem of imposing arbitrary restrictions on
the short run efﬁciency and they are not able to model ﬁrm
leveldynamic behavior. A second approach proposed by Ahn et al.
(2000) and Tsionas (2006) directly incorporates the dynamic behavior
of the inefﬁciency by specifying an autoregressive structure that recog
nizes inefﬁciency persistence over time. In particular, Tsionas (2006) ar
gues that adjustment costs prevent ﬁrms from making instant
adjustments towards optimal conditions and causes inefﬁciency persis
tence. Rigidities derived from the nature of some inputs, regulations,
transaction costs, information failures and other adjustment costs may
cause ﬁrms toﬁnd it optimal to remain partly inefﬁcient in the short run.
3.1. Heterogeneity in the electricity sector
Accounting for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in sto
chastic frontier models is still a concern since efﬁciency estimations are
sensitive to the modeling of sources of heterogeneity. In the case of ob
served heterogeneity, previous applications to the electricity distribu
tion sector have studied the effects of including different types of
covariates in the frontier, in the inefﬁciency or both. Hattori (2002)
found out that heterogeneity sources related to the load factor, customer
density and consumption density affect both, the shape of the frontier
and the level of technical efﬁciency. Goto & Tsutsui (2008) found only
customer density to have impacts on the technical efﬁciency of US
electricity distribution ﬁrms in a model that also includes consumption
density, time and a deregulation index in the inefﬁciency distribution.
In a recent study, Growitsch et al. (2012) considered weather factors
and found them to be inﬂuential on costs but have limited effects in
the efﬁciency estimations.
However, Growitsch et al. (2012) achieved more sensitivity in the
efﬁciency estimations when unobserved heterogeneity is included by
using a True Random Effects (TRE) model as proposed by Greene
(2005). Other recent studies in electricity distribution have also been
found to be relevant in considering this latent source of heterogeneity
in SFA models. Kopsakangas Savolainen & Svento (2011) perform a
good analysis of the effect of observed and unobserved heterogeneity3
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Fig. 2. Average number of customers and electricity consumption per ﬁrm.andwarn about the high changes produced in rankings of cost efﬁciency
under different models.
In the context of dynamic inefﬁciency models, Emvalomatis et al.
(2011) studied the effect of including technological unobserved hetero
geneity in an application to power generation plants in the US. Their
ﬁndings reveal high persistence of inefﬁciency overtime but also biases
in the efﬁciency estimations when unobserved factors are not consid
ered. However, it is also possible to think of heterogeneity regarding
the persistence parameters. This would be related to possible differ
ences in the adjustment costs amongﬁrms. The only studies considering
this issue have been applications to the banking sector, where this type
of heterogeneity has been found to be relevant (see Huang & Chen,
2009; Galán et al., in press).9
3.2. A dynamic heterogeneous model
We propose a dynamic stochastic frontier model that accounts for
both observed and unobserved heterogeneity sources. This is mainly
an extension of the model introduced by Tsionas (2006) that combines
it with other recent proposals in the literature of dynamic SFA models.
In particular, the proposed speciﬁcation accounts for observed ﬁrm
characteristics in the inefﬁciency dynamics, as in Tsionas (2006), but
also captures two additional sources of unobserved heterogeneity: the
ﬁrst one is related to differences in the adjustment costs among ﬁrms,
and we model it through a heterogeneous persistence parameter as in
Galán et al. in press; the second one is related to unobserved sources
of technological heterogeneity and we model it in a similar way to the
dynamic model in Emvalomatis (2012). The general model is given by
the following equations:
yit αi þ xitβ þ vit−uit ; vit ∼N 0;σ2v
 
ð1Þ
log uit ω þ zitγ þ ρi log ui;t 1 þ ξit; ξit ∼N 0;σ2ξ
 
; t 2…T ð2Þ
log ui1
ω þ zitγ
1−ρi
þ ξi1; ξi1 ∼N 0;
σ2ξ
1−ρ2i
!
; t 1: ð3Þ9 Huang & Chen (2009) include ﬁrm speciﬁc persistence parameters in the context of
models with forward-looking rational expectations while Galán et al. in press include
them in relation to the theory of adjustment costs.Eq. (1) represents the stochastic frontier, where in the case of a
production function yit is the output for ﬁrm i at time t, αi is the ﬁrm
speciﬁc parameter intended to capture unobserved technological
heterogeneity, xit is a row vector of the input quantities, β is a vector
of parameters, vit is the idiosyncratic error assumed to follow a normal
distribution, and uit is the inefﬁciency component. The dynamic speciﬁ
cation for the inefﬁciency is represented by (2), where ω is a constant
term, zit is a row vector of ﬁrm speciﬁc heterogeneity variables, γ is a
vector of parameters, ρi is the heterogeneous persistence parameter
capturing, for every ﬁrm, the proportion of inefﬁciency that is transmit
ted fromoneperiod to the next, and ξit is awhite noise processwith con
stant variance σξ2, whichmay capture unobserved random shocks in the
dynamic component. Finally, Eq. (3) represents the speciﬁcation of the
inefﬁciency in the ﬁrst period and is intended to initialize a stationary
dynamic process.
Stationarity is imposed by requiring the persistence parameters to
satisfy |ρi| b 1. This is important in order to avoid possible divergence
of log uit to positive or negative inﬁnity, whichwould lead to efﬁciencies
equal to zero or to one. These results are not desirable since in the ﬁrst
case they would mean that completely inefﬁcient ﬁrms remain in the
market, and in the second case that ﬁrms may be fully efﬁcient, contra
dicting the adjustment cost theory behind the formulation. In general, if
a ﬁrm has a value of ρi close to 1 it would suggest that this ﬁrm presents
high adjustment costs, which translates into a high proportion of inefﬁ
ciency being transmitted from one period to the next. On the other
hand,if this value is close to 0, a low proportion of inefﬁciency is persis
tent in time, implying that the ﬁrm may move quicker towards more
optimal conditions.
The general model in (2) and (3) allows to evaluate different speci
ﬁcations by imposing restrictions over some parameters. If αi = α is
assumed, then unobserved technological heterogeneity is not accounted
for. If ρi = ρ is imposed, homogeneous persistence is assumed for all
companies in the sector. If ρ= 0 the model reduces to a static model
where the inefﬁciency follows a log normal distribution with ﬁrm
speciﬁc mean. Finally, if no inefﬁciency covariates are observed, then
γ= 0 would be assumed.3.3. Bayesian inference
Inference of themodel in (1) till (3) is carried out using the Bayesian
approach. Bayesian inference of stochastic frontier models was intro
duced by van denBroeck et al. (1994) and allows incorporating formally
parameter uncertainty and obtaining posterior distributions of inefﬁ
ciencies for every observation.4
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Fig. 3. Average operational and capital expenses per ﬁrm.In general, we assume non informative but proper prior distribu
tions for all the parameters. For the parameter capturing unobserved
heterogeneity in the frontier we deﬁne a hierarchical structure where
αi ∼N α;λ 1αi
 
and the hyperparameter α ∼ N(0, λα−1). Priors for the
precision parameters λ are set to 0.1 and 0.001 for the ﬁrm speciﬁc
parameters and the hyperparameter, respectively. For parameters in β
we assume a normal prior distribution β ∼ N(0, Λ β−1) where Λ β is a
precision diagonal matrix with priors set to 0.001 for all parameters.
The variance of the idiosyncratic error component is assumed to follow
an inverse gamma distribution σ v2 ∼ IG(a, b) with priors set to 0.01 and
100 for the shape and scale parameters.
The inefﬁciency component as deﬁned in (2) follows a log
normal distribution where uit|ui,t − 1, ω, zit, γ, ρi, σ ξ2 ∼ LN(ω+ zitγ+
ρilog ui,t − 1, σ ξ2) for t=2… T. For t=1, the inefﬁciency is distributed
ui1jω; zi1;γ;ρi;σ2ξ ∼ LN ωþzi1γ1 ρi ;
σ2ξ
1 ρ2
i
 
.
Regarding the parameters in the inefﬁciency, the distribution for the
common constant term isω ∼ N(μω, λω−1) with priors set to−1.5 and 1
for the mean and precision parameters, respectively. The distribution
for the parameters of observed heterogeneity is: γ ∼ N(0, Λ γ−1) where
Λ γ−1 is a diagonal matrix of precisions with priors set to 0.1 for every
precision parameter. For the persistence parameters, we impose
|ρi| b 1 to assure stationarity and we deﬁne a hierarchical structure
with ρi = 2ki − 1, where ki ∼ β(k, 1 − k). The hyperparameter is
distributed k ∼ β(r, s) with priors set to 0.5 for shape parameters. The
variance of the inefﬁciency component is assumed to follow an inverse
gamma distribution where σξ−2 ∼ G(n, d) with priors set to 10 and 0.01
for the shape and scale parameters, respectively.10
Sensitivity analysis is performed on priors in the inefﬁciency compo
nent. Different values are used for prior parameters in the distributions
of ω, k and σ ξ2 and posterior results are found to converge to approxi
mately the same values.11
The speciﬁcation proposed accounts for ﬁrm speciﬁc effects in the
frontier and the inefﬁciency persistence. However, ﬁrms in the sector
share a common long run dynamic component ω, common elasticities
for the covariates given by γ, and are linked through common parame
ters ρ and α that are present in the hierarchical structures deﬁned.
As introduced by Koop et al. (1995), Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods and, in particular, the Gibbs Sampling algorithm
with data augmentation can be used. We carry out the implementation
of the proposed model using the WinBUGS package (see Grifﬁn &
Steel, 2007, for a general procedure in applications to SFA). For all the
estimated models we use 5000 iterations for posterior inference. The10 This is the same prior used by Tsionas (2006) and Galán et al. in press.
11 The priors used center the efﬁciency prior distributions at 0.8.MCMC algorithm involves 50,000 iterations with 10,000 discarded
in a burn in phase and a thinning equal to 8 is used to remove
autocorrelations.
Sensitivity analysis was performed by allowing changes in the
priors of the parameters in the inefﬁciency component. We examined
sensitivity to small changes in the values of n and d in the priors of
σξ−2 with no evidence of posterior sensitivity. For the persistence
parameter ρwe studied the sensitivity to the use of a truncated normal
distribution and posterior results were found to be robust to the use of
this alternative. Finally, we also studied changes in priors of ω since
they imply different priors on the efﬁciency but no important
differences were obtained in the posterior distributions. Fig. A.1 in the
Appendix presents prior and posterior distributions from some of
these experiments.
3.3.1. Comparison criteria
Using the MCMC output, we compare the different models derived
from (1) till (3) using a robust version of the Deviance Information
Criterion (DIC) and a criterion for predictive performance, which is
the Log Predictive Score (LPS).12
DIC is awithin samplemeasure ofﬁt introduced by Spiegelhalter et al.
(2002) and deﬁned as: DIC 2D θð Þ−D θ  with D(θ) = −2log f(y|θ),
where D(θ) deﬁnes the deviance of a model with parameters θ and
data y. The version of this criterion used here is the DIC3, as developed
in Richardson (2002) and Celeux et al. (2006), and its formulation is
the following:
DIC3 −4Eθ log f yð jθÞjy½  þ 2log f^ yð Þ: ð4Þ
This alternative uses an estimator of the density f(y|θ) instead of the
posterior mean θ and has been found to be more stable in models with
random effects, mixtures and with data augmentation (see Li et al.,
2012).
We also implement a criterion for evaluating out of samplebehavior
of the models, which is LPS. This criterion was ﬁrst introduced by Good
(1952)and is intended to examinemodel performance by comparing its
predictive distribution with out of sample observations. For this pur
pose the sample is split into a training and a prediction set. Our
prediction set consists of observations corresponding to the last two
observed years of every ﬁrm in the sample, and the training set contains
all the rest. The formula is the following:
LPS −1
k
Xk
i 1
log f yi;ti jprevious data
 
; ð5Þ12 Applications of both criteria to Bayesian SFA models can be found in Ferreira & Steel
(2007), Galán et al. (2014), and Grifﬁn & Steel (2004).
5
13 Lovell (2003) deﬁnes the combined effect of SECIt andMEIt as the volume effect.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of tariff per kWh in Colombia in real terms of 2012.where yi;ti represents the observations in the predictive set for the k
ﬁrms in the sample and ti represents the penultimate time point with
observed data for ﬁrm i.
3.4. Stochastic input distance function
Given that electricity distributors do not have control over electricity
consumption and the number of users, which are their natural outputs,
it is only possible to use input oriented models for measuring technical
efﬁciency. In this context, we assume that distribution ﬁrms use an
N × 1 vector of inputs x = (x1, x2,…, xN)′ to provide an M × 1 vector
of outputs q= (q1, q2,…, qM)′. Thus, we deﬁne an input set as follows:
Lg qð Þ x : x and technology g can produce q; ð6Þ
where the technology g satisﬁes the axioms of closeness, boundedness,
strong disposability and convexity as described by Färe &
Primont(1995). This technology can be represented by an input dis
tance function, which is deﬁned as:
DI x;q; gð Þ sup
λ
λ : x=λ ∈ Lg qð Þ ≥ 1
n o
; ð7Þ
where λ denotes themaximumamount bywhich an input vector can be
radially contracted while the output vector remains constant. We
assume that every distribution ﬁrm employs the best available technol
ogy in each period. Thus, the Debreu Farrell input oriented measure of
technical efﬁciency (TE) for ﬁrm i in period t is:
TE xit; qit ; tð Þ≡ 1=DI xit ; qit; tð Þ: ð8Þ
The input distance function has the following features: it is homoge
neous of degree one, a non decreasing concave function of inputs, and a
non increasingquasi concave function of outputs (see Färe & Primont,
1995). Linear homogeneity implies that it is possible to normalize all
the inputs in the distance function by an arbitrarily chosen input xNit :
1=xNit DI xit=xNit ; qit; t
 
exp −uitð Þ; ð9Þ
where uit ≡ lnDI xit=xNit ; qit; t
 
≥ 0. Then, a ﬁrm is technically efﬁcient if
and only if uit = 0 or similarly, TE(xit, qit, t) = 1.
Regarding the technology representation, we use a translog
functional form to parameterize the distance function. So, we deﬁne
vit ≡ lnDI xit=xNit ; qit ; t
 
−TL xit=xNit ; qit ; t
 
, where TL(.) is the translog
function. In this case, (9) becomes:
yit TL xit=xNit ; qit; t
 
þ vit−uit ; ð10Þwhere yit ≡−lnxNit . If any outputs or normalized inputs are stochastic
then vit is stochastic and (10) becomes a standard translog stochastic
frontier model. For estimation purposes, the random noise term vit is
assumed to follow a normal distribution and the inefﬁciency compo
nent uit is assumed to follow a nonnegative distribution. Using the
results for individual inefﬁciencies, TE in each period is calculated as:
TEit exp −uitð Þ: ð11Þ
Changes in productivity may also be computed from a stochastic
distance function (see Balk, 2001; Orea, 2002, for a parametric approach
to the computation of theMalmquist productivity index). In this context
an input oriented Malmquist productivity index can be computed and
decomposed into technical efﬁciency change (TEC), technical change
(TC), scale efﬁciency change (SEC) and an input mixed effect (IME) as
follows:
MPItI TECI TC
t;tþ1
I SEC
t
I ME
t
I ; ð12Þ
where I denotes the input orientation, and the four components can be
deﬁned using a parametric translog speciﬁcation as:13
TECI
DI x
t
; qt ; t
 
DI x
tþ1; qtþ1; t þ 1  ð13Þ
TCt;tþ1I
DI x
tþ1
; qtþ1; t þ 1
 
DI x
tþ1; qtþ1; t
  ð14Þ
SECtI
D
⌣
I x
t
; qt ; t
 
D
⌣
I x
t ; qtþ1; t
  DI x
t
; qtþ1; t
 
DI x
tþ1; qt ; t
  ð15Þ
MEtI
D
⌣
I x
t
; qtþ1; t
 
D
⌣
I x
tþ1; qtþ1; t
  DI x
tþ1
; qtþ1; t
 
DI x
t ; qtþ1; t
  ; ð16Þ
whereD
⌣
I stands for an input distance function associated with constant
returns to scale (see Pantzios et al., 2011, for the derivation using the
translog input oriented model).6
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Residential consumption (MWh) 785,665 1,118,006 13,499 4,687,938
Non-residential consumption (MWh) 729,120 1,138,132 9,069 5,637,621
Residential customers (#) 405,457 491,828 34,365 2,247,024
Non-residential customers (#) 40,672 57,430 2,935 294,734
Network length (km) 16,587 15,673 232 70,795
Customer hours lost (hours) 89.12 101.94 6.20 580.89
Energy losses (%) 16.25 7.45 4.02 38.57
Consumption density (kWh/user) 2,836 1,120 436 6,642
Customer density (users/km) 43.41 45.42 9.85 194.42
Total expenses (thousands USD) 239,034 363,063 1,395 1,768,1634. Data and empirical model
Information on expenses, consumption, users, network length and
quality indicators was collected for a sample of 21 electricity distribu
tion ﬁrms during the period 1998 2012. The main data sources are
CREG,SSPD and annual reports of the companies.Firms in the sample
distributed 81% of the total consumed kWh in Colombia during the
period and share 98% of total customers in the country. The data set is
an unbalanced panel with a total of 246 observations.14 Table 1 presents
a summary of statistics of the main variables. Monetary values are
expressed in thousands of USdollars in real termsof 2012 after deﬂating
by the consumer price index.
From these variables two outputs and three inputs are selected for
the speciﬁcation of the input distance function. Consumption and num
ber of customers are the standard outputs in electricity distribution;
however, they are usually highly correlated (0.95 in our sample) and
one of them should be chosen to avoid collinearity problems. In our
case, we select the number of users divided into residential (y1) and
non residential users (y2). Inputs are total expenses (x1), energy
losses(x2) and customer hours lost (x3). Total expenses is the sum of
operational and capital expenses. The former include administrative,
operative and maintenance expenditures and the latter corresponds to
the value of new investments in network cables, lines, ducts, tunnels
and other machinery, plant and equipment. Considering overall
total expenses is desirable for benchmarking electricity utilities (see
Giannakis et al., 2005). Moreover, since we also account for quality
measures, including total expenses recognizes that distribution ﬁrms
adopt different strategies mixing capital and operating investment
inputs in order to improve quality of service (see (Jamasb et al.,
2012)). We also include energy losses and the length of interruptions
as inputs where reductions are desirable. This approach has been used
before in applications to the electricity sector using SFA models with
distance functions (see Growitsch et al., 2005; von Hirschhausen et al.,
2006; Tovar et al., 2011). Giannakis et al. (2005) and Yu et al. (2009)
have also found these variables to be relevant in performing electric
utilities benchmarking analysis explicitly including quality of service.
Energy losses is the percentage of energy lost due to technical reasons
and customer hours lost is the duration of service interruptions
measured in hours per customer. We also include the network length
measured in kilometers (km) as a characteristic of the output which is
not directly under the control of ﬁrms. Finally, we consider two inefﬁ
ciency heterogeneity variables. These are consumption density (z1)
and customer density (z2). Consumption density is measured as the
number of kWh consumed per customer and customer density is
measured as the number of users per kilometer. Both variables are
expected to affect the inefﬁciency negatively in the sense that ﬁrms14 This ismainly due tomissing information in at least one variable for someﬁrms. How-
ever, all ﬁrms have data for consecutive years and there are no jumps in the time series of
the individual companies. Some acquisitions were presented during the period but we
keep them as individual ﬁrms given that in all cases the acquired companies have kept
their name and accountancy.may beneﬁt from serving urban locations and large customers. Goto &
Tsutsui (2008) have found customer density to drive technical inefﬁ
ciency in the US andMelo & Espinosa (2005) have found both variables
to affect inefﬁciency in Colombia.
We use a translog representation of the technology for the input
distance function derived in (10). The speciﬁcation used captures tech
nological change by including a time trend, its square and interactions
with inputs and outputsunder the assumption that every distribution
ﬁrmemploys the best available technology in each period. The estimated
model with the dynamic speciﬁcation presented in (1) till (3) is the
following:
ln x1it ¼ αi þ
X2
m 1
βm ln ymit þ βmþ1ln kmit þ
X2
r 1
δr ln
xrit
x1it
 !
þ1
2
X2
m 1
X2
n 1
βmn ln ymit ln ynit þ
1
2
X2
r 1
X2
s 1
δrs ln
xrit
x1it
 !
ln
xsit
x1it
 !
þ
X2
m 1
X2
r 1
ηmr ln ymit ln
xrit
x1it
 !
þ κ1 t þ
1
2
κ2 t
2 þ
X2
m 1
ϕmt ln ymit
þ
X2
r 1
φrt ln
xrit
x1it
 !
uit þ vit
log uit ¼ ω þ
X2
p 1
γpzpit þ ρi log ui;t−1 þ ξit; ξit∼N 0;σ
2
ξ
 
; t ¼ 2…T
log ui1 ¼
ω þ
X2
p 1
γpzpi1
1 ρi
þ ξi1; ξi1∼N 0;
σ2ξ
1 ρ2i
!
; t ¼ 1:
ð17Þ
Total expenses are used as a numeraire to accomplish linear homo
geneity in inputs and cross effects symmetry is imposed by requiring
βmn = βnm and δrs = δsr.
5. Estimation results
We estimate four different models derived from (17). The ﬁrst three
models do not account for unobserved technological heterogeneity, that
is, αi = 0. In addition, model (S) restricts ρi =0, so the model becomes
static and the inefﬁciency term follows a log normal distribution with
observed heterogeneity in its location parameter. The second model
(D) restricts ρi = ρ, which implies a dynamic model with ﬁxed persis
tence parameter. The third model (DPH) allows heterogeneous persis
tence through ρi. Finally, the fourth model (DPUH) is the complete
model in (17), which is dynamic and allows for heterogeneous persis
tence and unobserved heterogeneity. Results of the estimations are
presented in Table 2.
We observe in all the models the expected signs for inputs and out
puts, no relevant technological change and the presence of increasing
returns to scale.15 Differences in the posterior estimated coefﬁcients
are observed, mainly between the static and the dynamic speciﬁcations,
and between Model DPUH and therest. This suggests that modeling
time autocorrelation in the inefﬁciency component may have effects15 Further below we analyze in deep the effects of technical change and scale efﬁciency
along efﬁciency and productivity by groups of companies with similar characteristics.
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Table 2
Posterior mean and standard deviation of parameter distributions.
Parameters Model S Model D Model DPH Model DPUH
αi = α, ρi = 0 αi = α, ρi = ρ αi = α, ρi ≠ ρ αi ≠ α, ρi ≠ ρ
Parameter Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
ID function
α 13.4149 1.2091 12.6924 0.7935 11.4653 0.6624 11.4045 0.5543
β1 (ln y1) 0.1902 0.1215 0.0379 0.0257 0.0346 0.0219 0.1082 0.0266
β2 (ln y2) 0.0968 0.0991 0.1200 0.0806 0.0712 0.0530 0.0463 0.0248
β3 (ln x2) 0.0115 0.0087 0.0244 0.0135 0.0060 0.0050 0.0149 0.0134
β4 (ln x3) 0.0116 0.0088 0.0485 0.0168 0.0232 0.0197 0.0075 0.0056
β5 (ln km) 0.3494 0.0739 0.3265 0.1074 0.1265 0.0491 0.1413 0.0625
β6 (t) 0.1724 0.1217 0.0932 0.1336 0.0616 0.0808 0.0730 0.0684
β7 (t2) 0.0032 0.0010 0.0046 0.0012 0.0049 0.0006 0.0050 0.0005
ϕ1(1/2 ln y12) 1.0098 0.3705 1.3391 0.5202 1.6021 0.7925 1.5440 0.6968
ϕ2 (ln y1 ln y2) 0.4733 0.3262 0.8353 0.5289 1.4377 0.6969 1.3677 0.6227
ϕ3(1/2 ln y22) 0.1132 0.3291 0.2584 0.5504 1.2588 0.6821 1.2503 0.6303
ϕ4(1/2 ln x22) 0.0868 0.0463 0.0470 0.0450 0.0105 0.0362 0.0005 0.0346
ϕ5 (ln x2 ln x3) 0.0951 0.0224 0.0652 0.0321 0.0160 0.0147 0.0037 0.0147
ϕ6(1/2 ln x32) 0.0302 0.0174 0.0209 0.0194 0.0164 0.0112 0.0138 0.0124
δ1 (ln y1 ln x2) 0.2636 0.1341 0.2488 0.1303 0.2395 0.1451 0.1911 0.1275
δ2 (ln y2 ln x2) 0.4149 0.0977 0.3551 0.1001 0.2212 0.1136 0.1622 0.0967
δ3 (ln y1 ln x3) 0.0175 0.0822 0.0168 0.0767 0.0375 0.0563 0.0140 0.0554
δ4 (ln y2 ln x3) 0.2235 0.0728 0.1163 0.0623 0.0371 0.0542 0.0035 0.0525
κ1 (t ln y1) 0.0252 0.0211 0.0353 0.0238 0.0192 0.0157 0.0175 0.0141
κ2 (t ln y2) 0.0238 0.0196 0.0233 0.0211 0.0142 0.0138 0.0150 0.0126
κ3 (t ln x2) 0.0063 0.0075 0.0032 0.0074 0.0020 0.0047 0.0004 0.0041
κ4 (t ln x3) 0.0064 0.0040 0.0045 0.0040 0.0022 0.0025 0.0025 0.0022
Inefﬁciency
ω 1.4049 0.8467 0.0205 0.0050 0.0017 0.0002 0.0028 0.0002
ρ 0.8366 0.0846 0.6532 0.0850 0.6507 0.0868
γ1(ln z1) 0.3443 0.1008 0.0424 0.0081 0.0317 0.0024 0.0314 0.0168
γ2(ln z2) 0.4407 0.0838 0.1277 0.0394 0.1258 0.0553 0.1009 0.0452
σv 0.1653 0.0315 0.1314 0.0194 0.0943 0.0017 0.0977 0.0018
σϵ 0.1610 0.0517 0.0613 0.0023 0.0406 0.0038 0.0347 0.0029
Posterior eff. 0.5173 0.1205 0.5841 0.1551 0.6478 0.2600 0.6373 0.2420
DIC3 119.12 253.28 339.49 349.86
LPS 35.79 21.06 9.74 6.53on the frontier coefﬁcients and that capturing unobserved technological
sources is important in the frontier speciﬁcation. In general, we observe
that the more ﬂexible the model is in terms of accounting for dynamic
effects and heterogeneity, the better the values obtained for DIC3 and
LPS. Lower values for these criteria suggest better ﬁt and predictive
performance. It can be also seen that not only is the average technical
efﬁciency in the whole sector higher in the more ﬂexible models, but
also its dispersion. This may suggest that introducing dynamic effects
and unobserved heterogeneity sources distinguishes the presence of
adjustment costs and heterogeneity from technical inefﬁciency and
also differentiates ﬁrms depending on their speciﬁc characteristics.
These effects can also be observed in Fig. 5 where the evolution of1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
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Fig. 5. Evolution of posterior meaefﬁciency over time under the four models is plotted. We can also
observe that the dynamic models accounting for persistence heteroge
neity (DPH and DPUH) identify larger improvements in TE during the
period.
In order to understand better the effects of the different speciﬁca
tions on the efﬁciency estimates, we analyze the results at ﬁrm level
and their evolution over time by comparing the models derived from
(17) from the most to the least restrictive. In Fig. 6, we compare the
posterior efﬁciency distribution for a ﬁrm with median values for
customer and consumption density in 2012 under static and dynamic
formulations. We observe that introducing dynamic effects alter not
only the location of the distribution, by estimating higher values for2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
n TE under different models.
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Fig. 6. Posterior efﬁciency distribution for a representative ﬁrm in 2012.technical efﬁciency, but also that the dispersion is lower, which allows
more certainty on the individual efﬁciency estimations.
These differences in the posterior distributions also affect the
estimation of the evolution of technical efﬁciency over time. Fig. 7
presents the posterior mean efﬁciency estimations during the pe
riod for two ﬁrms, Electriﬁcadora del Quindío (EDEQ) and Empresas
Públicas de Medellín (EPM). We observe that for EDEQ, the dynamic
speciﬁcation estimates gains in technical efﬁciency that are not identi
ﬁed under the static model. This may suggest that the improvements
made by this ﬁrm during the period are more important in relative
terms given the presence of high adjustment costs in the sector. In the
case of EPM, results imply that, given the adjustment costs faced by all
ﬁrms in the sector, thisﬁrmdid not improve enough to identify efﬁcien
cy gains. These ﬁndings are important from the point of view of the reg
ulator because they suggest that ﬁrms could not explain poor
performance on the basis of modeled adjustment costs.
The dynamicmodel analyzed assumes that all distribution ﬁrms face
the same adjustment costs in terms of being able to adjust the same
proportion of inefﬁciency from one period to the next. However, ﬁrms
with different characteristics may present different adjustment costs,
so Model DPH allows for ﬁrm speciﬁc persistence parameters. Fig. A.2
in the appendix exhibits the 95% probability intervals for the persistence
estimations of every ﬁrm. Important differences in the individual posteri
or estimations of persistence are found, ranging from 0.31 to 0.99. This
suggests large heterogeneity in the adjustment costs of electricity
distributors that could be related to certain characteristics of these ﬁrms
and the incentiveregulation that they have faced, as is discussed further
below. These ﬁndings illustrate the importance of accounting for ﬁrm
speciﬁc persistence parameters, which have implications for the efﬁ
ciency estimations and their evolution over time as is observed in Fig. 5.
Finally, the full model in (17) is estimated accounting not only
for heterogeneous persistence but also for unobserved technological
heterogeneity. Although the evolution of efﬁciency is similar to that
estimated under Model DPH (see Fig. 5), Model DPUH identiﬁes unob
served ﬁrm effects that distinguish them in terms of the estimated
efﬁciency. Fig. 8 compares the posterior efﬁciency distributions for a
low and a high efﬁcient ﬁrm under models DPH and DPUH.16 We
observe that their posterior distributions move and shrink, implying a
reduction in the uncertainty of the individual estimations. It is also
important to notice that estimations of ﬁrm speciﬁc persistence param
eters do not present important changes compared to those obtained in
Model DPH.
Focusing on our preferredmodel (DPUH),we can identify some links
between differences in adjustment costs and ﬁrm characteristics. We
plot in Fig. 9 the average posterior distributions of the persistence16 The selectedﬁrms are Central Hidroeléctrica de Caldas (CHC) and Empresa Distribuidora
del Pacíﬁco (DISPAC).parameter by groups of ﬁrms. In general, we observe that ﬁrms with a
higher proportion of rural and small customers present lower adjustment
costs than those which are mainly urban and serve larger customers. In
contrast, by type of ownership andnumber of customers, nomajor differ
ences can be observed between ﬁrms in terms of inefﬁciency persistence.
This would imply that rural ﬁrms and those with small customers have
been able to adapt more easily towards optimal performance.
Differences between groups of Colombian utilities are also observed
in terms of efﬁciency. Fig. 10 exhibits the average posterior technical
efﬁciency during the period by groups of ﬁrms. We observe that mainly
urban distributors and ﬁrms serving high consumption customers have
beenmore efﬁcient during the period than their counterparts. Although
differences are smaller, this is also the case of private and large
distributors.
However, what it is more interesting in our dynamic analysis is the
change that these ﬁrms have exhibited from 1998 to 2012 in terms of
efﬁciency and productivity.We compute theMPI and its decomposition
as described in Eqs. (12) till (16), and present the results by group of
ﬁrms in Table 3. We observe that all types of ﬁrms except those in
urban areas and serving high consumption customers have increased
their productivity during the period. This improvement has been driven
in all the cases by increases in technical efﬁciency, which has compen
sated the technological regress suggested by the results for technical
change for all ﬁrms. Regarding scale efﬁciency change, only private,
rural and ﬁrms with low consumption customers exhibit some
improvement in terms of operating at the efﬁcient scale. Finally, the
input mix effect exhibit values very close to 1 for all groups which
suggests that changes in the input mix during the period have kept
scale efﬁciency almost unaltered.
In general, ruralﬁrms and those serving low consumption customers
exhibit very important increases in productivity during the post reform
period explained by improvements in their scale efﬁciency but mainly
due to large increases in technical efﬁciency. These ﬁrms are also
those exhibiting lower inefﬁciency persistence and therefore those
with higher scope for improvement.
This relationship between inefﬁciency persistence and changes in
technical efﬁciency is presented in Fig. 11 where the average posterior
inefﬁciency persistence is plotted against their average posterior TE in
1998 and 2012 for every identiﬁed group of ﬁrms. We observe that
ﬁrms with high inefﬁciency persistence have barely changed their TE.
This is particularly noticeable for urban distributors and ﬁrms with
high consumption customers. On the other hand, rural companies
and ﬁrmswithmore small customers seem to catch upwith their coun
terparts in terms of efﬁciency during the period.17 This suggests that in
centives introduced by the regulator during the period, in terms of17 In TableA.1 of AppendixAwe present these results for eachﬁrmalongwith other ﬁrm
characteristics.
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Fig. 8. Posterior efﬁciency distributions for CHC and DISPAC.service quality, have helped distributors with low consumption
customers and in rural areas to improve their efﬁciency but that they
have not been effective for their counterparts, which in absence of
new incentives may become stuck in terms of technical efﬁciency.
6. Conclusions
The electricity reform in Colombia introduced the separation of
activities in the electricity sector and set the conditions for privatization
and competition. In general, the reform has had positive effects on the
ability of the sector to overcome extreme weather conditions and
meet demand requirements. However, for distribution companies, com
petition and privatization have been slow processes and the users did
not beneﬁt from improvements in service quality for the ﬁrst ten
years after the reform. In fact, previous studiesmeasuring consequences
of the reform on efﬁciency have not found evidence of improvements,
although large differences in efﬁciency have been found among ﬁrms.
Thismay indicate the presence of high adjustment costs in the sector
in Colombia and important heterogeneity factors among distributors.
We include these conditions in a stochastic frontiermodel that accounts
for dynamic effects and unobservedheterogeneity. Our ﬁndings suggest
high inefﬁciency persistence in the sector that could be related to
adjustment costs and inadequate incentive regulation. However,important differences are found among ﬁrms. In particular, ﬁrms
operating mainly in rural markets and serving small customers present
lower adjustment costs than ﬁrms with the opposite characteristics.
This condition has allowed these ﬁrms to catch up urban ﬁrms and
ﬁrms serving large users, which should draw the attention of the
regulator because they seem to be stuck in terms of technical efﬁciency.
In fact, customer density and consumption density are found to be
important inefﬁciency drivers in the sector, and sources of unobserved
heterogeneity are relevant in distinguishing heterogeneity from inefﬁ
ciency and identifying differences among ﬁrms.
Our ﬁndings may be helpful for the Colombian regulator and the
Ministry of Mines and Energy, which have been recently working on
the composition of groups of distribution ﬁrms that would share the
same prices.18 These groups have been formed following geographical
criteria. However, our results suggest that the design of these groups
should mainlyconsider the inefﬁciency persistence level of each ﬁrm
and their characteristics in terms of customer density and consumption
density.
Overall, efﬁciency in the Colombian distribution sector has been
found to exhibit improvements. However, efﬁciency gains can only be10
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Fig. 9. Average posterior distribution of ρi by groups of ﬁrms.
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Fig. 10. Average posterior distribution of efﬁciency by groups of ﬁrms.clearly identiﬁed in the last ﬁve years. This period coincides with the
main reductions in the length of interruptions and energy losses, and
the highest rates of increase in the number of customers. AlthoughTable 3
Decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index by groups of ﬁrms.
Firms TEC TC SEC ME MPI
Private 1.0930 0.9399 1.0167 0.9956 1.0445
Public 1.1694 0.9417 0.9736 1.0023 1.0722
Small 1.2714 0.9419 0.9753 1.0024 1.1680
Large 1.1932 0.9386 0.9572 0.9996 1.0720
Rural 1.4723 0.9384 1.0343 1.0007 1.4290
Urban 1.0396 0.9407 0.9694 1.0058 0.9480
Low cons 1.4701 0.9440 1.0102 0.9987 1.4019
High cons 0.9986 0.9387 0.9666 1.0073 0.9061
Total 1.2161 0.9388 1.0332 0.9972 1.1795very preliminary, these results may favor the recent incentive regula
tion policies for improving quality of service and reducing energy losses.
Nevertheless, the last ﬁve years have also been characterized by impor
tant increases in the electricity tariff for regulated users. Not only has
the tariff per kWh increased during the period, but also the proportion
derived from distribution costs has increased relative to the other tariff
components. This implies that Colombian users are now receiving a bet
ter service but that they are paying the costs of these improvements via
higher tariffs.19 These results suggest that incorporating willingness to
pay into the efﬁciency analysis of the Colombian distribution sector
would be of interest for future research.19 In fact, for the case of UK, Yu et al. (2009) have found the social cost of outages to be
considerably higher than the utilities' incentives.
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Table A.1
Posterior mean estimations of TE and persistence under model DPUH, customer density and consumption density by ﬁrm.
Firm Average TE 1998–2012 Inefﬁciency persistence Cust. dens. (users/km) Cons. dens. (kWh/user)
Central Hidroeléctrica de Caldas S.A. E.S.P. (CHC) 0.5520 0.9713 31199 341
Centrales Eléctricas de Nariño S.A. E.S.P. (CEDENAR) 0.3045 0.9651 23072 474
Centrales Eléctricas del Norte de Santander S.A. E.S.P. (CENSA) 0.6118 0.9872 13996 94
CODENSA S.A. E.S.P. (CODENSA) 0.9894 0.9981 47207 830
Compañía de Electricidad de Tuluá S.A. E.S.P. (CETSA) 0.9892 0.9996 47355 2116
Compañía Energética del Tolima S.A. E.S.P. (ENERTOLIMA) 0.4667 0.3120 13205 77
Electriﬁcadora de Santander S.A. E.S.P. (ESSA) 0.4624 0.4096 33639 152
Electriﬁcadora del Caquetá S.A. E.S.P. (ELECTROCAQUETA) 0.4977 0.6700 20120 209
Electriﬁcadora del Caribe S.A. E.S.P. (ELECTRICARIBE) 0.4506 0.6960 40553 336
Electriﬁcadora del Huila S.A. E.S.P. (ELECTROHUILA) 0.4720 0.3862 16663 94
Electriﬁcadora del Meta S.A. E.S.P. (EMSA) 0.5033 0.8584 39699 261
Empresa de Energía de Arauca E.S.P. (ENELAR) 0.4260 0.7571 21334 981
Empresa de Energía de Boyacá S.A. E.S.P. (EBSA) 0.9960 0.9999 21356 237
Empresa de Energía de Casanare S.A. E.S.P. (ENERCA) 0.3677 0.9615 13352 110
Empresa de Energía de Cundinamarca S.A. ESP (EEC) 0.4760 0.5221 42579 153
Empresa de Energía de Pereira S.A. E.S.P. (EEP) 0.4913 0.6509 21193 299
Empresa de Energía del Quindío S.A.E.S.P. (EDEQ) 0.6487 0.9930 33337 452
Empresa de Energía del Pacíﬁco S.A. E.S.P. (EPSA) 0.7303 0.9959 50925 269
Empresa Distribuidora del Pacíﬁco S.A. E.S.P. (DISPAC) 0.4233 0.8853 22464 475
Empresas Municipales de Cali E.I.C.E. E.S.P. (EMCALI) 0.7328 0.9895 61707 2331
Empresas Públicas de Medellín E.S.P. (EPM) 0.9015 0.9988 82735 389Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2014.08.024.
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